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 At the turn of the century, Russell, Husserl and Couturat singled out Leibniz the 
logician as an important precursor of the way they thought philosophy should be done. Like 
their most gifted contemporaries they conceived of philosophy as essentially  argumentative 
and - as Russell put it in a 1911 talk in French - analytic. Unsurprisingly, the search for the 
best arguments and analyses meant that good philosophy was cosmopolitan. William James 
and Ernst Mach were read everywhere. James studied Mach and the pupils of Brentano, 
whom Stout introduced to Cambridge. Moore recognised the deep kinship between his work 
on ethics and that of Brentano. Russell was influenced by Peano, used and criticised Meinong 
and was attacked by Poincaré. Pragmatism was subjected to a series of criticisms by realists in 
German and in English but gradually began to win adherents, for example in Italy, where 
Vailati and Calderoni introduced both pragmatism and Austrian philosophy of mind. 
 
 Philosophy at the end of the century presents a very different aspect. Two very 
different complex (families of) philosophical traditions occupy the scene - Analytic and 
Continental philosophy. The terminology is neither happy nor stable. John Searle likens 
distinguishing between philosophies in this way to the claim that America has two parts, 
Kansas and business; Bernard Williams compares it to the distinction between cars which are 
Japanese and those with front-wheel drive. Members of the first tradition hesitate between 
"analytic" and "analytical" and many of their heroes were in fact from the continent. A short 
list of such heroes would include the names of  Russell and Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap and 
Tarski, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Lewis, Putnam, Nozick and Rawls, Strawson, Armstrong, 
Dummett, Wiggins, Williams and Evans. Behind them  stands the tradition's grandfather, the 
great German logician and philosopher Gottlob Frege. Among Frege's earliest readers were 
Couturat and Russell - who immediately proclaimed his importance - and Husserl - who 
maintained a strange silence on the subject. 
 
 The heroes of Continental philosophy are Heidegger, Adorno, Bachelard, Kojève, 
Gadamer, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Lévinas, Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, 
Lyotard, Vattimo, Severino, Apel and Habermas. Among the tradition's grandparents are 
Marx, Nietzsche, Dilthey, the later Husserl and Bergson; more distant ancestors are the 
German idealists.  
 
 Analytic philosophy is international; it is the dominant tradition in the English 
speaking world, in Poland and in Scandinavia and forms a large minority  in, for example, 
Germany and Spain. Continental philosophy, like the Belgian Empire, is by and large a 
Franco-German creation, but its readership and influence are thoroughly international. The 
term "Continental philosophy" seems to have been invented in North America and both there 
and around the globe Continental philosophy has put a very firm mark on most of the 
humanities."A dead hand" say many analytic philosophers. "Ressentiment !" retort the friends 
of "Theory". Analytic philosophy, after all, has left no comparable mark on the humanities. 
 
 Analytic philosophers spend their time doing very much what Husserl, Couturat and 
Russell urged philosophers to do at the turn of the century - arguing for and against or 
elucidating some proposition, analysing and describing, drawing distinctions and constructing 
theories. Continental philosophers spend their time creating concepts and conceptual poetry, 
subverting, suspecting, unmasking, decoding, deconstructing and intuiting (for example, 
listening to) entities that are rarely as manageable as some particular thesis or theory and more 
often of the order of magnitude of this or that feature of the entire Western tradition or, 
indeed, Being tout court. Analytic philosophers, of course, also deconstruct and subvert but 
they tend to assume that it is better to subvert via argument or analysis than otherwise. 
Continental philosophers, on the other hand, invariably deconstruct and construct through the 
medium of commentary and exegesis; they present their views via readings of the great 
philosophical texts of the tradition; their attitude is what Barry Smith has called "textual 
deference". Although such a near identification between philosophy and its history is foreign 
to the analytic tradition, an important minority of analytic philosophers do philosophy by 
arguing with past philosophers, just as Husserl, Couturat and Russell did. 
 
 Although certain problems and preoccupations have been more important than others 
within analytic philosophy - the philosophy of language, for example, loomed large until the 
1980's - it is difficult to think of a philosophical position that has not been defended by some 
analytical philosopher. Similarly, although this was not always the case, there are now few 
areas of philosophy which have failed to stimulate analytic appetites. There is analytic 
philosophy of music, analytic Marxism, analytic Thomism, analytic feminism, analytic 
phenomenology; even Freud has been analysed. And analytic metaphysics and ontology once 
again occupy the position they enjoyed at the beginning of  analytic philosophy. 
 
 Continental philosophy also exhibits a wide variety of positions or, rather, stances, but 
a more limited variety. One or other form of anti-realism is widespread. There is little interest 
in the philosophy of the hard sciences. German Idealism is invariably taken very seriously 
indeed. And, unlike analytic philosophy, Continental philosophy has political allures, which 
are often on display in the media. 
 
 One of the stranger features of the analytic-continental divide is the fact that the often 
violently negative reactions to be found in the oral traditions on each side so rarely manifest 
themselves in published form. There are exceptions to the rule: Popper on the Frankfurt 
school, Albert on hermeneutics, Searle on Derrida and "Theory", Tugendhat on Husserl and 
Heidegger; and some journal numbers have been devoted to the divide. There are, of course, 
also influential bridge-builders, such as Ricoeur, Habermas and Rorty. But many analytic 
philosophers - particularly young analytic philosophers on the continent who have first-hand 
experience of Continental philosophy - react to bridge-building much as Peirce did on 
learning of James' attempt to connect up his compatriot and Bergson: "The only thing I have 
striven to do in philosophy has been to analyse sundry concepts with exactitude...It is not very 
grateful to my feelings to be classed along with Bergson who seems to be doing his prettiest 
to muddle all distinctions". When Heidegger says that the time of distinctions is past young 
analytic philosophers in Spain and Slovenia disagree. Intellectual and political bridge-
building are, after all, like intellectual and political tolerance, two different things. 
 
 It is clear enough that, at some suitably high level of abstraction, similarities can 
indeed be found between, say, Heidegger or Derrida and Wittgenstein or Davidson 
(Heidegger and Wittgenstein did not think of themselves as contributing to any theoretical 
philosophical enterprise but as destroyers; Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl's account of 
ideal meanings and of inner perception resembles Wittgenstein's rejection of  Fregean senses 
and of observation of one's own mental states etc.). But what, to use a metaphor dear to 
James, Husserl and analytic philosophers, is the cash-value of such similarities ? A question 
all the more pressing in a discipline such as philosophy in which so many of the positions and 
conclusions are already familiar and in which what counts is the path to these conclusions.  
 
 Continental philosophy attracted more critical discussion before the Second World 
War than after. Members of nearly every philosophical tradition still attached to argument, 
analysis and clarity, including for example the future member of the Vienna Circle, Otto 
Neurath, published detailed criticisms of Spengler's Decline of the West. A little later, another 
member of the Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, and a pupil of Brentano's, Oskar Kraus, 
deconstructed Heidegger's pronouncement "Nothing noths". Sydney Hook's 1930 impressions 
of  contemporary German philosophy describe a horrifying philosophical milieu ("almost 
everyone proclaims Sein und Zeit to be an epoch-making book, but [no]one can say why") in 
very much the same accents later employed by Jacques Bouveresse in his appraisals of recent 
Parisian philosophy (Le philosophe chez les autophages, Rationalité et cynisme). 
 
 The publication of Pascal Engel's La dispute. Une Introduction à la philosophie 
analytique and of  Franca D'Agostini's Analitici e continentali. Guida alla filosofia degli 
ultimi trent'anni marks a new stage in the relations between the two traditions. In Engel's 
witty and often racy dialogues and correspondence between Philoconte, Mésothète and 
Analyphron the latter presents a history of analytic philosophy and an outline of a number of 
debates within it. More importantly, Philoconte "articulates" what is perhaps the greatest 
number of critical reactions to analytic philosophy ever assembled in print, reactions that are 
familiar enough to analytic philosophers on the continent. Thus analytic philosophy is 
accused of being scholastic, naive, pre-Kantian, a logical tyranny, a form of scientism, blind 
to the "closure of western metaphysics as established by Heidegger", of lacking the depth and 
systematicity of the German idealists, of being a typical Anglo-Saxon club. The metaphor 
already mentioned, "the cash value of an argument", simply exemplifies "the reign of 
technical thought" in all its vulgar splendour. Analyphron's list of some 70 paradoxes, puzzles 
and thought experiments leads Philoconte to accuse analytic philosophy of failing to see that 
its "timeless problems" are indissociable from a historic context and that philosophy must 
proceed historically and of ignorance of Kant's demonstration of the impossibility of 
metaphysics. 
 
 D'Agostini's remarkable 550 page survey of the last thirty years of philosophy, 
analytic and continental, with many glances further back, is perhaps the first history of 
twentieth century philosophy to be built around the distinction. A best-seller in Italy, it has 
provoked lively discussions in newspapers such as Il Sole-24 Ore  and on the Web, some of 
which are now available in the last number of the Rivista di Estetica. She sets out five 
philosophical and metaphilosophical debates - about the end of philosophy, the analytic-
continental divide, the subject, the turn from metaphysics to language, and relativism - and 
gives a learned, thoroughly documented (except for the absence of an index of proper names) 
and wide-ranging history of analytic philosophy, hermeneutics, critical theory, 
poststructuralism and postmodernism and of the philosophy of science. 
 
 Engel and D'Agostini succeed in getting their protagonists to actually engage about 
historical and metaphilosophical questions, such as the end and ends of philosophy, rather 
than about first-order philosophical questions. Each displays a rare mastery of the history of 
the debates dealt with (although they perhaps underestimate the amount of interaction 
between recent analytic philosophy and cognitive science). A sure grasp of a field as a whole 
is, indeed,  a feature of many recent books by analytic philosophers on the continent and one 
which distinguishes these from many better known books written by anglophones. The new 
surveys of the philosophy of language, by Manuel García-Carpintero, and of the philosophy 
of science, by José Díez and Ulises Moulines, are, in this respect and others, exemplary. 
 
 The upsurge of discussions of Continental philosophy by analytic philosophers and of 
analytic philosophy by Continental philosophers is not unconnected with the changing 
institutional face of analytic philosophy on the continent, in particular the creation of a 
European Society for Analytic Philosophy, of  its large Central European Section,  and of 
national societies in Germany, Italy, France, Spain and elswhere. The creation of such 
societies has recently been condemned by Hilary Putnam who finds these societies 
"exclusionary". The only legitimate function for movements in philosophy, he suggests, is to 
gain attention and recognition for neglected ideas; analytic philosophy, however, as one of the 
dominant currents in world philosophy, is not in this category. But while analytic philosophy 
is certainly known of on the Continent the widespread assumption there that every analytic 
philosopher is a positivist, a philosopher of language or a (would-be) Anglo-Saxon suggests 
that it is not well-known. Whatever one may think of the melodramatic features of logical 
positivism or of positivism as a philosophy, some of the reasons given by the members of the 
Vienna Circle when they launched their movement 70 years ago are just as compelling today  
for those who see contemporary Franco-German philosophy as the development of German 
philosophy in the 1920's. 
 
 Interest in the history of analytic philosophy has grown considerably since the 
publication of Michael Dummett's Origins of Analytic Philosophy. A recent contribution to 
the genre, The Story of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Anat Biletzhi and Anat Matar, contains 
rather more philosophy than actual history, thus reflecting a habit most analytic philosophers 
find hard to shake off. One fine contribution to the volume, by Peter Hylton, traces some of 
the different conceptions and views of analysis within analytic philosophy. But the entire 
Polish contribution to analytic philosophy and logic, for example, is barely mentioned in the 
pieces collected. The Polish tradition was itself an off-shoot of philosophy in Austria-
Hungary (and its predecessor and successor states). From Bolzano to Brentano and Mach this 
tradition was one of the most important precursors of analytic philosophy and then, thanks to 
Wittgenstein, Gödel and the Vienna Circle, an integral part thereof.  Austrian Philosophy Past 
and Present, a Festschrift for Rudolf Haller who, together with Roderick Chisholm, has done 
so much to show that Austrian philosophy is not German philosophy, brings together a 
number of important reevaluations of claims by Haller and others, such as Neurath, the first 
historian of analytic philosophy, and Scheler, about Austrian philosophy. 
 
 It is above all Continental philosophers who believe that history will set us free. Thus 
it is all the more surprising that, in milieux where the history of philosophy in German from 
Kant to Nietzsche and from Dilthey, the later Husserl and Heidegger onwards is so 
assiduously studied, the origins of  an important part of Continental Philosophy, the 
phenomenological legacy, are so little known.  
 
 Consider, for example, the following philosophical topics: the nature of  the 
nondescriptive, singular reference effected by proper names and demonstratives; the 
consequences of thought-experiments about Twin-Earth for a theory of reference; the 
structure of speech acts such as promises and orders; the role of a speaker's intentions in a 
theory of meaning; the nature of defeasible, non-inductive justification; the role of make-
believe in aesthetics and logic; non-conceptual perceptual content and the distinction between 
veridical perception and hallucinations; the connexions between perception, action and bodily 
awareness; the relation between an ethical and political psychology which allows an 
important place for shame and ressentiment,  on the one hand, and the morality systems of 
Kant or utilitarianism, on the other hand. 
 
 These topics have a number of interesting properties. First, they are familiar to 
analytic philosophers as problems that have been intensively discussed within their tradition. 
Secondly, they  were also the problems discussed in German before and after the First World 
War by the heirs of Brentano, in particular by Husserl and his first pupils. These pupils were 
attracted by  the realist, Austrian Husserl who, at the turn of the century, was engaged in 
developing the ideas of Bolzano, Brentano and Mach. But, thirdly, as phenomenology was 
slowly transformed, by Husserl's turn towards a windy form of German Idealism (a 
development that dismayed Husserl's first pupils) and then by Heidegger, phenomenologists 
lost all interest in these problems. Indeed, the analysing, descriptive way of doing 
phenomenology went out of fashion and was all but dead by 1934. Fourthly, as philosophical 
topics go, these topics are all relative new-comers. It is difficult to find analyses of these 
matters, as detailed and as argued as those given by Brentano's heirs and by analytic 
philosophers, before the end of the last century. (Although medieval philosophy is always 
good for the odd surprise). Finally, as far as I can tell, this intriguing part of the history of 
philosophy on the continent was completely forgotten. Perhaps philosophy on the continent is 
going through the process Continental philosophers are wont to call the return of the 
repressed. 
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